

TO: Jackson County Election Board & Jackson County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/27/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Jackson County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On May 27, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Jackson County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Jackson County formally requested designation on March 30, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Jackson County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Jackson County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk, Hope Cissna. The audit was scheduled and conducted on May 27, 2026 at the Jackson County Judicial Center in Brownstown, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Jackson County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 75% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1-3% risk limit, meaning it carried a 97-99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 97-99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1-3% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Jackson County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 27, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Jackson County Judicial Center – Brownstown, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 6,476
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) Jackson County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 16.65%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 61 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Jackson County Commissioner District 3
 - Intended Risk Limit – 3%
 - Diluted Margin – 3.29%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 239 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 6476 Smallest margin (votes): 1,078. Diluted margin: 16.65%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Jackson County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Roger Drew	Votes:	1962
Candidate 2 Name:	Mark D. Holt	Votes:	556
Candidate 3 Name:	Dustin Steward	Votes:	3040

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 61.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 6476 Smallest margin (votes): 213. Diluted margin: 3.29%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Jackson County Commissioner District 3

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Roger Bane	Votes:	2417
Candidate 2 Name:	Andrew Stauffer	Votes:	2630

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 3%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 239.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Commissioner margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Jackson County Judicial Center at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Jackson County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Duncan Klemm, IT Specialist
- Payton Glesing, Graduate Assistant for Training & Assessment

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Hope Cissna, Jackson County Clerk
- Melissa Acton, Jackson County Election Board
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote
- Jack Georgopoulos, MicroVote

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Jackson County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Jackson County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
50060413453491237562

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 293 ballots, and both contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 293 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican Jackson County Sheriff contest, approximately 61 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3 contest, approximately 239 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 3% risk limit, producing 97% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the respective 1–3% risk limits and 97–99% confidence levels. A total of 263 ballots were sampled: 252 Republican ballots were inspected across both audited contests, and 11 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 252 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican Jackson County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 252

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 58.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 58.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 58 ballots

For the Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **3%** risk limit, confirming with **97%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 252

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 222.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 222.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 3% risk limit and 97% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 222 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Jackson County Clerk, Hope Cissna, for her coordination and the Jackson County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Jackson County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State's Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

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
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