



2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit Summary Report

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Post-Election Audit Overview

The Voting System Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP) was authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State (SOS) to conduct post-election audits (PEA) of the 2026 Primary Election. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Seven counties: Jackson, Tipton, Whitley, Sullivan, Porter, Scott, and Randolph formally requested audit designation through the passing of a unanimous County Election Board Resolution. All counties were granted designation as Primary Election post-election audit counties by the Secretary of State. Jackson, Tipton, Whitley, Sullivan, Porter, Scott, and Randolph counties successfully completed post-election audits of their 2026 Primary Elections. This report will summarize all Primary Election audit activities and the official results of each completed audit.

Two different audit types were used to conduct these post-election audits. Jackson, Tipton, Whitley, Sullivan, Scott, and Randolph counties conducted a Ballot-Comparison Audit and Porter County conducted a Ballot-Polling Audit. These two types of post-election audits use risk-limiting audit procedures, as applicable, using the Stark Audit Tool developed by Dr. Philip Stark.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Indiana's certified DRE voting system vendor, MicroVote, produces two essential records for each ballot: a Cast Vote Record (CVR), the digital record generated by the voting system, and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system.

The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This process gives voters confidence that the digital vote records were not manually altered or affected by system errors, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

Indiana counties using Optical Scan (OpScan) voting systems with paper ballot cards undergo a ballot-polling post-election audit to verify election outcomes. Indiana has three certified Optical Scan voting system vendors: ES&S, Hart InterCivic, and Unisyn. Rather than verifying the accuracy of each individual ballot, this audit type applies statistical methods to hand-count a random sample of ballots, providing strong evidence that the reported election outcome is correct.

The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample generated in real time. Ballots are then hand-counted until sufficient evidence confirms the audit outcome would align with the officially certified results. For an audit to confirm an election outcome, the hand-counted sample must achieve a maximum 5% risk limit and a minimum 95% confidence level. VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with confidence using risk limits ranging from 1–5% and corresponding confidence levels of 95–99%. If the confidence level is not reached in the initial sample, it does not mean there is an error in the election outcome; it simply means more ballots will need to be hand-counted until at least a 95% confidence level in the audited results is achieved. This process gives voters confidence in voting system tabulation because if a hand count were to continue all the way to a full manual recount, the audit assures the outcome would match what was officially reported.

Nationally, the definition, methods, processes, and procedures of post-election audits vary from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Indiana’s audit procedures use risk-limiting audit methods that have been adapted to best fit the election systems used and processes established by state and local election officials. Expanded information on Indiana’s post-election audit procedures can be found at <https://sites.bsu.edu/vstop>.

A brief summary of each post-election audit can be found in the following section of this report. For each county, basic details and critical information will be provided, followed by the results for all audited contests within the county. The full county-level Post-Election Audit Summary Reports can be found in *Appendix A-G*. These reports provide expanded details of the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Audit Summaries and Results

Jackson County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** May 27, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Jackson County Judicial Center – Brownstown, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 6,476
- **Audit Seed Number:** 50060413453491237562
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican Jackson County Sheriff
 - Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3

- **Results:** A total of 252 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For the Republican Jackson County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
 - For the Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **3% risk limit**, confirming with **97% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Jackson County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix A*.

Tipton County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** May 28, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Tipton County Courthouse – Tipton, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 3,026
- **Audit Seed Number:** 84778977101411649402
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican U.S. Representative District 5
 - Republican Indiana State Senator District 21
 - Republican Indiana State Representative District 38
- **Results:** A total of 70 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For all three audited contests, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Tipton County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix B*.

Whitley County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** June 2, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Whitley County Government Center – Columbia City, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 3,716
- **Audit Seed Number:** 69909564441231822477
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican U.S. Representative District 3
 - Republican Whitley County Sheriff
- **Results:** A total of 61 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For both audited contests, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Whitley County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix C*.

Sullivan County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** June 11, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Sullivan County Courthouse – Sullivan, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 4,099
- **Audit Seed Number:** 12453035276683842228
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican Indiana State Representative District 45
 - Republican Sullivan County Sheriff
 - Republican Sullivan County Commissioner District 1
- **Results:** A total of 115 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For all three audited contests, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Sullivan County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix D*.

Porter County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** June 12, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Porter County Board of Elections & Registration Office – Valparaiso, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** ES&S / Ballot-Polling Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 19,245
 - Republican Ballots Cast: 8,563
 - Democratic Ballots Cast: 10,682
- **Audit Seed Number:** 70562833237594186407
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican U.S. Representative District 1
 - Republican Porter County Prosecuting Attorney
 - Democratic U.S. Representative District 1
 - Democratic Porter County Commissioner District 2
- **Results:**
 - For the Republican U.S. Representative District 1 contest, 198 ballots were hand counted. Of those, 188 had voted selections and 10 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Barb Regnitz received 133 votes, and losing candidates Ben Ruiz and James Kent (Jim) Schenke received 35 and 40 votes, respectively. The hand counted totals of 188 ballots resulted in a **1% risk limit**, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99% confidence** that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.
 - For the Republican Porter County Prosecuting Attorney contest, 251 ballots were hand counted. Of those, 236 had voted selections and 15 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Andrew Bennett received 142 votes, and losing candidate Harry Peterson received 94 votes. The hand counted totals of 236 ballots resulted in a **1% risk limit**, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99% confidence** that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.
 - For the Democratic U.S. Representative District 1 contest, 420 ballots were hand counted. Of those, 409 had voted selections and 11 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Frank Mrvan received 322 votes, and losing candidate Lavetta Sparks-Wade received 87 votes. The hand counted totals of 409 ballots resulted in a **1% risk limit**, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99% confidence** that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.

- For the Democratic Porter County Commissioner District 2 contest, 442 ballots were hand counted. Of those, 409 had voted selections and 33 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Kyle S. Nelson received 249 votes, and losing candidate James Kocal received 160 votes. The hand counted totals of 409 ballots resulted in a **1% risk limit**, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99% confidence** that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.
- More information detailing the Porter County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix E*.

Scott County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** June 24, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Scott County Courthouse – Scottsburg, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 2,378
- **Audit Seed Number:** 31587782685032507152
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican Scott County Auditor
 - Republican Scott County Sheriff
- **Results:** A total of 74 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For both audited contests, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Scott County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix F*.

Randolph County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** June 26, 2026
- **Audit Location:** Randolph County Courthouse – Winchester, Indiana
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot-Comparison Audit
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 3,557
- **Audit Seed Number:** 42432105888657965313
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Republican Indiana State Senator District 26
 - Republican Randolph County Sheriff
 - Republican Randolph County Commissioner Western District

- **Results:** A total of 66 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.
 - For all three audited contests, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1% risk limit**, confirming with **99% confidence** that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcomes were correct.
- More information detailing the Randolph County Post-Election Audit can be found in *Appendix G*.

In Closing

Completion of these post-election audits provides statistical confidence and practical assurance that the election systems used in the 2026 Primary Elections by Jackson, Tipton, Whitley, Sullivan, Porter, Scott, and Randolph counties functioned properly, resulting in correctly reported election outcomes for audited contests in all audited counties.

Additional information about post-election audits in Indiana can be found at <https://sites.bsu.edu/vstop>. The county-level Post-Election Audit Summary Reports (Appendix A-G) detail all activities relating to a county's respective post-election audit. Reviewing this information and these reports can assist in gaining a full-scope understanding of Indiana's post-election audit procedures.

VSTOP would like to thank the Jackson, Tipton, Whitley, Sullivan, Porter, Scott, and Randolph County Clerks' Offices for their coordination. VSTOP would also like to thank the County Election Boards for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP is appreciative to the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for their authorization and support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

APPENDIX A

Jackson County Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Jackson County Election Board & Jackson County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/27/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Jackson County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On May 27, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Jackson County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Jackson County formally requested designation on March 30, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Jackson County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Jackson County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk, Hope Cissna. The audit was scheduled and conducted on May 27, 2026 at the Jackson County Judicial Center in Brownstown, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Jackson County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 75% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1-3% risk limit, meaning it carried a 97-99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 97-99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1-3% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Jackson County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 27, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Jackson County Judicial Center – Brownstown, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 6,476
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) Jackson County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 16.65%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 61 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Jackson County Commissioner District 3
 - Intended Risk Limit – 3%
 - Diluted Margin – 3.29%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 239 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 6476 Smallest margin (votes): 1,078. Diluted margin: 16.65%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Jackson County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Roger Drew	Votes:	1962
Candidate 2 Name:	Mark D. Holt	Votes:	556
Candidate 3 Name:	Dustin Steward	Votes:	3040

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 61.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 6476 Smallest margin (votes): 213. Diluted margin: 3.29%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Jackson County Commissioner District 3

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Roger Bane	Votes:	2417
Candidate 2 Name:	Andrew Stauffer	Votes:	2630

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 3%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 239.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Commissioner margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Jackson County Judicial Center at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Jackson County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Duncan Klemm, IT Specialist
- Payton Glesing, Graduate Assistant for Training & Assessment

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Hope Cissna, Jackson County Clerk
- Melissa Acton, Jackson County Election Board
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote
- Jack Georgopoulos, MicroVote

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Jackson County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Jackson County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
50060413453491237562

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 293 ballots, and both contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 293 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican Jackson County Sheriff contest, approximately 61 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3 contest, approximately 239 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 3% risk limit, producing 97% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the respective 1–3% risk limits and 97–99% confidence levels. A total of 263 ballots were sampled: 252 Republican ballots were inspected across both audited contests, and 11 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 252 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican Jackson County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 252

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 58.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 58.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 58 ballots

For the Republican Jackson County Commissioner District 3 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **3%** risk limit, confirming with **97%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 252

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 222.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 222.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 3% risk limit and 97% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 222 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Jackson County Clerk, Hope Cissna, for her coordination and the Jackson County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Jackson County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State's Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX B

Tipton County

Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Tipton County Election Board & Tipton County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/27/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Tipton County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On May 28, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Tipton County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Tipton County formally requested designation on May 5, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Tipton County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on May 19, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Tipton County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk, Christy Crawford. The audit was scheduled and conducted on May 28, 2026 at the Tipton County Courthouse in Tipton, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Tipton County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 77% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Tipton County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 28, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 9:15 AM – Audit Begins 10:00 AM
- **Location:** Tipton County Courthouse – Tipton, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 3,026
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) U.S. Representative District 5
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 14.87%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 69 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Indiana State Senator District 21
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 34.24%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 30 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Indiana State Representative District 38
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 15.73%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 65 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3026 Smallest margin (votes): 450. Diluted margin: 14.87%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP U.S. Representative District 5

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Scott A. King	Votes:	891
Candidate 2 Name:	Victoria Spartz	Votes:	1341

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 69.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of U.S. Rep Dist. 5 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3026 Smallest margin (votes): 1,036. Diluted margin: 34.24%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP State Senator District 21

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	James (Jim) Buck	Votes:	659
Candidate 2 Name:	Tracey Powell	Votes:	1695

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 30.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of IN State Senator Dist. 21 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3026 Smallest margin (votes): 476. Diluted margin: 15.73%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP State Representative District 38

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Mark Hufford	Votes:	841
Candidate 2 Name:	Heath R. Vannatter	Votes:	1317

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size: 65.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of IN State Rep Dist. 38 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Tipton County Courthouse at approximately 9:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 10:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Tipton County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Payton Glesing, Graduate Assistant for Training & Assessment

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Christy Crawford, Tipton County Clerk
- Heather Dowler, Tipton County Clerk's Office
- Rhiannon Tansy, Tipton County Clerk's Office
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Tipton County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Tipton County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
84778977101411649402

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 99 ballots, and all three contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 99 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican U.S. Representative District 5 contest, approximately 69 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Indiana State Senator District 21 contest, approximately 30 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Indiana State Representative District 38 contest, approximately 65 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the intended 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level. A total of 86 ballots were sampled: 70 Republican ballots were inspected across all audited contests, and 16 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 70 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican U.S. Representative District 5 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 70

1-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
1-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0
2-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Audit complete
If no more differences are observed: 65.
If differences continue at the same rates: 65.
Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing "Audit Complete", and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 65 ballots

For the Republican Indiana State Senator District 21 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 70

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 28.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 28.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 28 ballots

For the Republican Indiana State Representative District 38 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 70

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 61.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 61.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 61 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Tipton County Clerk, Christy Crawford, for her coordination and the Tipton County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Tipton County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State's Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX C

Whitley County Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Whitley County Election Board & Whitley County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/27/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Whitley County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On June 2, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Whitley County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Whitley County formally requested designation on March 13, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Whitley County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Whitley County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and Election Supervisor, Jessica Hockemeyer. The audit was scheduled and conducted on June 2, 2026 at the Whitley County Government Center in Columbia City, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Whitley County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 80% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Whitley County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** June 2, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Whitley County Government Center – Columbia City, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 3,716
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) U.S. Representative District 3
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 34.36%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 30 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Whitley County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 41.6%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 25 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3716 Smallest margin (votes): 1,277. Diluted margin: 34.36%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP U.S. Representative District 3

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Jon M. Kenworthy	Votes:	851
Candidate 2 Name:	Marlin A. Stutzman	Votes:	2128

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 30.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of U.S. Rep District 3 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3716 Smallest margin (votes): 1,546. Diluted margin: 41.6%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Whitley County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Gary Archbold	Votes:	743
Candidate 2 Name:	Jason Spencer	Votes:	2289

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 25.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Whitley County Government Center at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Whitley County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Cindy Doolittle, Whitley County Clerk
- Jessica Hockemeyer, Whitley County Clerk's Office
- Mike Malcolm, Whitley County Election Board
- Karen Western, Whitley County Election Board
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote
- Sam Miller, MicroVote

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Whitley County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Whitley County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
69909564441231822477

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 99 ballots, and both contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 99 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican U.S. Representative District 3 contest, approximately 30 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Whitley County Sheriff contest, approximately 25 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect every audited contest on each ballot selected for the audit, using a sample size equal to the largest number of ballots required by any single contest. When that required sample is 35 ballots or fewer, VSTOP offers counties the option to double the sample size. This added inspection doesn't improve the audit's statistical reliability, but it does make for a more visibly thorough process for the public to understand and trust. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the respective 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level. A total of 72 ballots were sampled: 61 Republican ballots were inspected across both audited contests, and 11 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 61 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican U.S. Representative District 3 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 61

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 28.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 28.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 28 ballots

For the Republican Whitley County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 61

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 24.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 24.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 24 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Whitley County Clerk - Cindy Doolittle, and Election Supervisor - Jessica Hockemeyer, for their coordination and the Whitley County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Whitley County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State's Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX D

Sullivan County Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Sullivan County Election Board & Sullivan County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/27/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Sullivan County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On June 11, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Sullivan County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Sullivan County formally requested designation on March 9, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Sullivan County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Sullivan County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk, Tonya Bedwell. The audit was scheduled and conducted on June 11, 2026 at the Sullivan County Courthouse in Sullivan, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Sullivan County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 76% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Sullivan County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** June 11, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Sullivan County Courthouse – Sullivan, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 4,099
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) Indiana State Representative District 45
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 9%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 113 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Sullivan County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 15.17%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 67 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Sullivan County Commissioner District 1
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 16.35%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 62 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 4099 Smallest margin (votes): 369. Diluted margin: 9%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) IN State Representative District 45

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Bruce Borders	Votes:	1371
Candidate 2 Name:	Kellie E. Streeter	Votes:	1740

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 113

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of IN State Rep District 45 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 4099 Smallest margin (votes): 622. Diluted margin: 15.17%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) Sullivan County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Justin Copeland	Votes:	1691
Candidate 2 Name:	Mike Luttrell	Votes:	349
Candidate 3 Name:	Matt Price	Votes:	1069

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 67.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 4099 Smallest margin (votes): 670. Diluted margin: 16.35%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) Sullivan County Commissioner District 1

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Tonya Bedwell	1419
Candidate 2 Name: Brian Keith Gilham	717
Candidate 3 Name: Chad Robertson	265
Candidate 4 Name: Wes Scarbrough	749

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

	1-vote	2-vote
Overstatements	0.001	0.0001
Understatements	0.001	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 62.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Commissioner margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Sullivan County Courthouse at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Sullivan County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Training and Assessment Specialist

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Tonya Bedwell, Sullivan County Clerk (observed since she was a candidate on the ballot)
- Doug Followell, Sullivan County Election Board
- Melissa Ranard, Sullivan County Clerk's Office

- Jill Harrison, Sullivan County Clerk's Office
- Judy Martindale, Sullivan County Clerk's Office
- Alesha Arnett, Sullivan County Clerk's Office
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote
- Sam Miller, MicroVote

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Sullivan County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Sullivan County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

12453035276683842228

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 173 ballots, and all three contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 173 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican Indiana State Representative District 45 contest, approximately 113 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Sullivan County Sheriff contest, approximately 67 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Sullivan County Commissioner District 1 contest, approximately 62 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the intended 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level. A total of 145 ballots were sampled: 115 Republican ballots were inspected across all audited contests, and 30 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 115 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican Indiana State Representative District 45 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 115

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate Audit complete

If no more differences are observed: 107.

If differences continue at the same rates: 107.

Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 107 ballots

For the Republican Sullivan County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 115

1-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
 2-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
 1-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0
 2-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 64.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 64.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 64 ballots

For the Republican Sullivan County Commissioner District 1 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 115

1-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
 2-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0
 1-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0
 2-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 59.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 59.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 59 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Sullivan County Clerk, Tonya Bedwell, for her coordination and the Sullivan County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Sullivan County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State's Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX E

Porter County Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Porter County Board of Elections & Registration and Porter County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/28/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Porter County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On June 12, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Porter County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Porter County formally requested designation on March 26, 2026 via a Board of Elections Resolution. Porter County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Porter County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk – Jessica Bailey and Board of Elections & Registration Director – Sundae Schoon. The audit was scheduled and conducted on June 12, 2026 at the Porter County Board of Elections & Registration Office in Valparaiso, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Porter County to select two Republican and two Democratic Primary contests for audit. VSTOP conducts audits of the Democratic and Republican contests separately since Porter County uses paper ballot cards and they can be separated by political party. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize nearly all ballots cast in the Primary Election including absentee by mail, absentee in-person, and Election Day ballots. Provisional ballots require additional action post-election, so they were not able to be sorted into their respective precincts from which they may have originated. While they were cast and counted, they were not included in the inventory for the audit, which accounts for the 4-ballot difference between the certified results and the “total ballots cast” used in the audit tool. This had no impact on the integrity or efficacy of the audit and its purpose. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit. VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with confidence using risk-limits ranging from 1-5% and respective confidence levels ranging 95-99%. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach a maximum risk limit of 5% and a minimum 95% confidence level. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means that more ballots will need to be hand counted until there is at minimum 95% confidence level reported for the sample of that audited contest.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Porter County and included all votes cast in the Primary Election, excluding provisional ballots. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** June 12, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:00 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Porter County Board of Elections & Registration Office – Valparaiso, Indiana
- **Total Ballots Cast Included in Audit:** 19,245 (4 provisionals not included)
 - Republican Ballots Cast: 8,563 (1 provisional not included)
 - Democratic Ballots Cast: 10,682 (3 provisionals not included)
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) U.S. Representative District 1
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 38.62%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 48 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Porter County Prosecuting Attorney
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 23.18%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 163 Ballots
 - (Democratic Primary) U.S. Representative District 1
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 62.68%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 23 Ballots
 - (Democratic Primary) Porter County Commissioner District 2
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 14.38%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 408 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 8563 Smallest margin (votes): 3,307. Diluted margin: 38.62%.

Contest 1. Contest name:
 REP U.S. Representative District 1

Winners: 1 ▾

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Barb Regnitz	Votes:	4956
Candidate 2 Name:	Ben Ruiz	Votes:	1483
Candidate 3 Name:	James Kent (Jim) Schenke	Votes:	1649

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 48.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of U.S. Representative Dist. 1 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 8563 Smallest margin (votes): 1,985. Diluted margin: 23.18%.

Contest 1. Contest name:
 REP Prosecuting Attorney

Winners: 1 ▾

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Andrew L. Bennett	Votes:	4996
Candidate 2 Name:	Harry Peterson	Votes:	3011

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 163.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of Prosecuting Attorney margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 10682 Smallest margin (votes): 6,696. Diluted margin: 62.68%.

Contest 1. Contest name:
DEM U.S. Representative District 1

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Frank J. Mrvan	Votes:	8566
Candidate 2 Name:	Lavetta Sparks-Wade	Votes:	1870

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 23.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of U.S. Representative Dist. 1 margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 10682 Smallest margin (votes): 1,536. Diluted margin: 14.38%.

Contest 1. Contest name:
DEM County Commissioner Dist 2

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	James Kocal	Votes:	4057
Candidate 2 Name:	Kyle S. Nelson	Votes:	5593

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 408.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Commissioner margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Porter County Board of Elections & Registration Office at approximately 10:00 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials and volunteers participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Porter County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Alisa Gray, Training and Assessment Specialist
- Payton Glesing, Graduate Assistant for Training & Assessment

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Jessica Bailey, Porter County Clerk
- Sundae Schoon, Board of Elections & Registration Director
- Tara Graf, Board of Elections & Registration Assistant Director
- Paul Rausch, Board of Elections Member
- JC Colter, Board of Elections Member
- Kathy Hartwig, Porter County Clerk's Office
- Cindy Fish, Board of Elections & Registration
- Barbara Gamble, Board of Elections & Registration
- 15 Porter County Election Workers sworn in to serve as Audit Volunteers
- Dustin Renner, Indiana Secretary of State's Office

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Polling Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Polling Audits.

Indiana counties using Optical Scan voting systems with paper ballot cards undergo a ballot-polling post-election audit to verify election outcomes. Porter County utilizes ES&S, one of Indiana's three Optical Scan voting system vendors certified in the state. The audit applies statistical methods to hand-count a random sample of ballots, providing strong statistical evidence that the reported election outcome is correct. Rather than verifying the accuracy of each individual ballot and exact vote totals, this approach holistically affirms the overall integrity of the voting system's reported outcome by hand-counting ballots until sufficient evidence confirms the audit outcome would align with the officially certified results.

While the intended achieved risk limit for this audit is 1%, for the audit to be deemed successful, the audited results must meet a maximum risk limit of 5%, yielding a minimum confidence level of 95%. This process gives voters confidence that the voting system accurately tabulated ballots and reported correct election outcomes.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The audit of both the Democratic and Republican contests used the same seed number.

The seed number for the Porter County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

70562833237594186407

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. For the Republican contests, VSTOP drew an initial sample of 771 ballots, and both Republican contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For the Democratic contests, VSTOP drew an initial sample of 775 ballots, and both Democratic contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot when applicable. While it was highly unlikely all ballots from these samples would be needed, these larger samples accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to two key factors. First, ballot-polling audits require voted selections only. If a ballot was undervoted for the contest being audited, it must be skipped and an additional ballot must be counted in its place. Second, if the initial estimated sample does not reach the intended confidence level, additional ballots must be counted until at least the maximum 5% risk limit and minimum 95% confidence level are met.


For the Republican U.S. Representative District 1 and Republican Porter County Prosecuting Attorney contests, an initial batch of at least 163 ballots would be hand counted prior to results being checked against the maximum 5% risk limit and minimum 95% confidence level.

For the Democratic U.S. Representative District 1 and Democratic Porter County Commissioner District 2 contests, an initial batch of at least 408 ballots would be hand counted prior to results being checked against the maximum 5% risk limit and minimum 95% confidence level.

The Republican contests were audited first, with 251 Republican ballots sampled in total. Following the completion of the Republican contests, the Democratic contests were audited, with 442 Democratic ballots sampled in total. The outcome of the hand count for each audited contest and the achieved audit results are presented in the following section.


Audit Results

For the Republican U.S. Representative District 1 contest, VSTOP and County Election Officials hand counted 198 ballots. Of those, 188 had voted selections and 10 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Barb Regnitz received 133 votes, and losing candidates Ben Ruiz and James Kent (Jim) Schenke received 35 and 40 votes, respectively. The hand counted totals of 188 ballots resulted in a **1%** risk limit, satisfying the required **<5%** threshold and confirming with **99%** confidence that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.




Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1% risk limit and >99% confidence level was achieved based on a hand count of 188 randomly selected ballots

For the Republican Porter County Prosecuting Attorney contest, VSTOP and County Election Officials hand counted 251 ballots. Of those, 236 had voted selections and 15 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Andrew Bennett received 142 votes, and losing candidate Harry Peterson received 94 votes. The hand counted totals of 236 ballots resulted in a **1%** risk limit, satisfying the required **<5%** threshold and confirming with **99%** confidence that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.




Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved based on a hand count of 236 randomly selected ballots

For the Democratic U.S. Representative District 1 contest, VSTOP and County Election Officials hand counted 420 ballots. Of those, 409 had voted selections and 11 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Frank Mrvan received 322 votes, and losing candidate Lavetta Sparks-Wade received 87 votes. The hand counted totals of 409 ballots resulted in a **1%** risk limit, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99%** confidence that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1% risk limit and >99% confidence level was achieved based on a hand count of 409 randomly selected ballots

For the Democratic Porter County Commissioner District 2 contest, VSTOP and County Election Officials hand counted 442 ballots. Of those, 409 had voted selections and 33 were skipped due to undervotes. Winning candidate Kyle S. Nelson received 249 votes, and losing candidate James Kocal received 160 votes. The hand counted totals of 409 ballots resulted in a **1%** risk limit, satisfying the required <5% threshold and confirming with **99%** confidence that the machine-tabulated election outcome was correct as reported.



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1% risk limit and >99% confidence level was achieved based on a hand count of 409 randomly selected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Porter County Clerk – Jessica Bailey and Board of Elections & Registration Director – Sundae Schoon, for their coordination and the Porter County Board of Elections & Registration for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office for approving Porter County’s audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State’s Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana’s Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP’s Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX F

Scott County

Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Scott County Election Board & Scott County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/28/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Scott County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On June 24, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Scott County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Scott County formally requested designation on March 4, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Scott County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Scott County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and County Clerk, Michelle Shelton. The audit was originally scheduled for June 1, 2026, but due to Clerk responsibilities for a major court case and trial, the audit had to be rescheduled. The audit was conducted on June 24, 2026 at the Scott County Courthouse in Scottsburg, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Scott County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 60% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull more Republican ballots. It could take increased sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Scott County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** June 24, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Scott County Courthouse – Scottsburg, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 2,378
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) Scott County Auditor
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 13.75%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 74 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Scott County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 26.96%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 38 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 2378 Smallest margin (votes): 327. Diluted margin: 13.75%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Scott County Auditor

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Kristi Richie Johnson	Votes:	854
Candidate 2 Name:	Jennifer Rode-Hamelman	Votes:	527

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 74.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Auditor margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 2378 Smallest margin (votes): 641. Diluted margin: 26.96%.

Contest 1. Contest name: REP Scott County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Shawn S. Mayer	Votes:	405
Candidate 2 Name:	Scott Zellers	Votes:	1046

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 38.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Scott County Courthouse at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Scott County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Alisa Gray, Training and Assessment Specialist

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Michelle Shelton, Scott County Clerk
- Hannah Dickerson, Scott County Clerk's Office
- Steve Shamo, MicroVote
- Sam Miller, MicroVote
- Scott Zarazee, Indiana Secretary of State's Office

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Scott County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Scott County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

31587782685032507152

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 121 ballots, and both contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 121 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican Scott County Auditor contest, approximately 74 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Scott County Sheriff contest, approximately 38 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the respective 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level. A total of 118 ballots were sampled: 74 Republican ballots were inspected across both audited contests, and 44 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 74 ballots were inspected checking both contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican Scott County Auditor contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 74

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 70.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 70.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 70 ballots

For the Republican Scott County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 74

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 36.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 36.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 36 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Scott County Clerk – Michelle Shelton, and Chief Deputy – Hannah Dickerson, for their coordination and the Scott County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office for approving Scott County’s audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State’s Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana’s Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP’s Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Chad Kinsella, PhD



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX G

Randolph County Post-Election Audit Summary Report

TO: Randolph County Election Board & Randolph County Clerk's Office

DATE: 7/28/2026

SUBJECT: Summary of Randolph County 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audit

On June 26, 2026, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Randolph County, Indiana, of the 2026 Primary Election. The following report will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and county participation is voluntary, with official designation granted by the Secretary of State. Randolph County formally requested designation on March 13, 2026 via a County Election Board Resolution. Randolph County was granted designation by the Indiana Secretary of State on April 29, 2026 and VSTOP began coordinating audit preparation.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process and answer any questions Randolph County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests were finalized, coordinated by VSTOP and Chief Deputy Clerk, Natasha Mock. The audit was scheduled and conducted on June 26, 2026 at the Randolph County Courthouse in Winchester, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

VSTOP advised Randolph County to audit only Republican primary contests this cycle. That's because of the overwhelming margin of Republican to Democratic ballots cast, and the inability to separate primary ballots by party when using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. For example, auditing a Democratic contest may require an inspection of 25 ballots. Since the ballots cannot be separated, and Republican votes held just over 82% of the vote share, it can be expected the random sample would pull many more Republican ballots. It could take exorbitant sample sizes to reach the 25 Democratic ballots that were needed for inspection because of the significant disparities in party vote share. While no Democratic contests were selected for audit, the integrity of ballots cast and machine accuracy can be inferred because the Republican ballots being sampled are from machines used by both parties during Early Voting and Election Day.

In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

The audit was conducted with an intended 1% risk limit, meaning it carried a 99% confidence level. In simple terms, this means the audit had a 99% chance of catching a significant tabulation error, if one existed, and only a 1% chance of missing one. The only way to reach 100% certainty would be to inspect every single ballot, but that's a full recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Randolph County's voting system vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Since absentee mail-in votes were not audited, the total ballots cast and vote totals used in the audit reflect only absentee in-person and Election Day votes. VSTOP tested the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned correctly, completing all pre-audit preparation.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** June 26, 2026
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Setup and Pre-Audit Meeting 9:15 AM – Audit Begins 10:00 AM
- **Location:** Randolph County Courthouse – Winchester, Indiana
- **Absentee In-Person and Election Day Ballots Cast:** 3,557
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - (Republican Primary) Indiana State Senator District 26
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 17.18%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 59 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Randolph County Sheriff
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 26.6%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 39 Ballots
 - (Republican Primary) Randolph County Commissioner Western District
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Diluted Margin – 23.19%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 44 Ballots

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3557 Smallest margin (votes): 611. Diluted margin: 17.18%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) IN State Senator District 26

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Scott A. Alexander	Votes:	1712
Candidate 2 Name:	Katherine (Kat) Nunley-Kritsch	Votes:	1101

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 59

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of IN State Senator margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3557 Smallest margin (votes): 946. Diluted margin: 26.6%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) Randolph County Sheriff

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Jordan T. Alfrey	Votes:	809
Candidate 2 Name:	Monte Gaddis	Votes:	387
Candidate 3 Name:	Chad M. Puterbaugh	Votes:	1755

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences. Calculate size 39

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Sheriff margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 3557 Smallest margin (votes): 825. Diluted margin: 23.19%.

Contest 1. Contest name: (REP) Randolph County Commissioner Western District

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Jane A. Grove	Votes:	1570
Candidate 2 Name:	Michael Ortman	Votes:	745
Candidate 3 Name:	Robert J. Smith	Votes:	473

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 44.

Above: Stark Audit Tool screenshot of County Commissioner margin, intended risk limit, & sample size

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by Election Systems Audit Specialist Matt Housley, arrived at the Randolph County Courthouse at approximately 9:15 AM and began audit setup. While the team prepared, Matt held a pre-audit meeting with all County Election Officials participating in the audit, covering the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewing and confirming contest selection and election result totals, and conducting a final review of the public presentation to be given just prior to the audit. By approximately 10:00 AM, both the pre-audit meeting and audit setup were complete, and Randolph County's post-election audit officially began.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Training and Assessment Specialist
- Duncan Klemm, IT Specialist

Election Stakeholders who participated in this audit included:

- Jacqueline Peed, Randolph County Clerk
- Natasha Mock, Randolph County Clerk's Office
- Kristy Barnett, Randolph County Democratic Party Representative
- Ben Wells, Randolph County Republican Election Board Member

- Sam Miller, MicroVote
- Jared Turner, MicroVote
- Scott Zarazee, Indiana Secretary of State's Office

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process, including the Ballot-Comparison Audit method used for this audit. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this report. VSTOP conducted the audit using the Stark Audit Tool, built specifically for Ballot-Comparison Audits.

Indiana counties using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems undergo a ballot-comparison post-election audit to verify machine functionality. Randolph County utilizes MicroVote, a DRE voting system vendor, whose machines produce two essential records: a Cast Vote Record (CVR) - the digital record generated by the voting system and a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) - the corresponding paper record produced by the voting system. The audit process begins with the selection of a random ballot sample that is generated in real time. Each sampled ballot's CVR is then compared directly against its corresponding VVPAT. For the audit to be deemed successful, every sampled ballot must yield a 100% CVR-to-VVPAT match rate for the selected contests, ensuring that the digital and paper records are in complete agreement. This inspection gives the public confidence that there was no significant manipulation or malfunction of digital vote records, by checking them against the voter's original printed records from Early Voting and Election Day.

The sample was drawn in real time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die, ensuring the sample was truly random and that no one could know in advance which ballots would be selected. The seed number also serves as a control, allowing the audit to be replicated in its entirety if ever needed.

The seed number for the Randolph County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
42432105888657965313

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool, generating a random sample of ballots. VSTOP drew an initial sample of 99 ballots, and all three contests were reviewed using ballots from this sample. For Ballot-Comparison Audits, voted selections and undervotes can be used for inspection; if a contest was undervoted by the voter, the sampled ballot is inspected for an undervoted CVR-to-VVPAT match. While it was highly unlikely all 99 ballots would be needed, this larger sample accounted for the expected need to draw additional ballots due to one key factor: VVPATs cannot be separated by political party on DRE voting systems. Since Republican contests were selected for audit, any Democratic ballot drawn in the sample is skipped and not inspected for that contest, though a CVR-to-VVPAT match could still be confirmed if needed. For every skipped ballot, an additional ballot must be inspected to replace it.

For the Republican Indiana State Senator District 26 contest, approximately 59 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Randolph County Sheriff contest, approximately 39 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

For the Republican Randolph County Commissioner Western District contest, approximately 44 ballots were required for inspection to achieve a 1% risk limit, producing 99% confidence that the voting equipment functioned properly and the election outcome was correctly reported.

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all audited contests on each audited ballot, sampling up to the greatest number of ballots required across contests. Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team reviewed each ballot for a CVR-to-VVPAT match on all audited contests, continuing inspection until the required number of ballots was met to achieve the intended 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level. A total of 76 ballots were sampled: 66 Republican ballots were inspected across all audited contests, and 10 Democratic ballots were skipped. The outcomes of the inspection were tracked and are summarized below.

Audit Results

A total of 66 ballots were inspected checking all three contests, with every ballot showing a matching CVR-to-VVPAT comparison, resulting in a **100% match rate**.

For the Republican Indiana State Senator District 26 contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 66

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 56.

If differences continue at the same rates: 56.

Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 56 ballots

For the Republican Randolph County Sheriff contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 66

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 36.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 36.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 36 ballots

For the Republican Randolph County Commissioner Western District contest, this result satisfied the required sample thresholds to achieve a **1%** risk limit, confirming with **99%** confidence that the voting systems operated accurately and the reported election outcome was correct.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 66

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 42.
 If differences continue at the same rates: 42.
 Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing “Audit Complete”, and that a 1% risk limit and 99% confidence level was achieved after inspecting 42 ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Randolph County Clerk - Jacqueline Peed and Chief Deputy Clerk – Natasha Mock, for their coordination and the Randolph County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. VSTOP would also like to thank the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office for approving Randolph County’s audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2026 Primary Election Post-Election Audits, a State Summary Report of all Primary Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and published publicly by the Secretary of State’s Office.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana’s Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP’s Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Jay Bagga, PhD




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